The need to give incentives is usually absent in the literature on minimum wages. However, especially in the service sector it is important how well a job is done, and employees must be incentivized to perform accordingly. Furthermore, many aspects regarding service quality cannot be veried, which implies that relational contracts have to be used to provide incentives. The present article shows that in this case, a minimum wage increases implemented eort, i.e., realized service quality, as well as the eciency of an employment relationship. Hence, this paper can explain why productivity and service quality went up after the introduction of the British National Minimum Wage, and that this might actually have caused a more ecient labor market. Furthermore, several empirically observed implications of a (higher) minimum wage can be explained. It might reduce turnover of employees, have spillover eects on higher wages, and reduce wage dispersion.
Introduction
Minimum wage laws and its positive or negative eects are one of the most controversially debated issues in economics. When trying to understand its consequences, however, only limited attention has been paid to how a minimum wage aects the provision of incentives.
In this article, I show that a minimum wage has a crucial impact on a rm´s optimal choice of incentives and consequently on social welfare. If rms are forced to pay a higher wage than actually intended, they will require their employees to do a better job in return.
In an environment where performance is not veriable and labor turnover is high, an appropriate minimum wage can furthermore be eciency-enhancing and increase the surplus of an employment relationship.
Minimum wages are especially relevant in the service sector. There in particular what matters is how well -and not only that -a job is done. The degree of service quality provided by employees is important for customer satisfaction and will have an impact on a rm's prots. Take employees of a fast food restaurant, who are supposed to be friendly to customers and careful when preparing the food. A cleaner can do a supercial job or clean everything thoroughly, and a nightwatchman might be more or less attentive. Then, it is necessary to incentivize workers, and the question arises how this should and can be done. As many aspects of service quality are highly subjective and cannot be precisely measured, it will generally be dicult to capture all relevant dimensions in an explicit, i.e., court enforceable, contract.
Hence, relational contracts are needed to give incentives, and unsatisfactory performance is not detected and punished by a court. More precisely, relational contracts are used in settings where employees need incentives to perform a desired task but where it is impossible or at least very dicult to verify eort and output. This implies that all contingent compensation must be enforceable within an equilibrium of the dynamic game, and cooperation can only be sustained if the discounted future value of the employment relationship is suciently high.
The present article analyzes the impact of a minimum wage on the optimal choice of incentives within a relational contracting framework. A labor market with many homogeneous rms (also denoted as principals) and employees (or agents) exists, with excess supply of labor.
Agents work if they believe they will be compensated, whereas principals only reward agents for their eort if reneging triggers sucient punishment. However, agents can be costlessly replaced, and the market is not fully transparent in a sense that if turnover occurs, it is not possible to detect the reason, i.e., whether an agent is red or leaves voluntarily. Thus, a rm cannot have an external -or market -reputation for honoring its promises and faces a commitment problem. Instead of making promised payments as a reward for previous eort, rms might have an incentive to renounce and replace employees. Therefore, agents know that they are not compensated for their eort unless replacement is suciently costly. This implies that an equilibrium with positive eort can only be enforced if (endogenous) turnover costs are present. A natural way to induce these costs (and preventing surplus destruction) is a social equilibrium where all new agents receive a rent which is at least as high as the payment promised to agents as a compensation for eort. However, rms are also exposed to these turnover costs whenever their employees leave for exogenous reasons. Although they have all bargaining power, rms are thus not able to capture the whole surplus of an employment relationship. Instead, they face a tradeo between giving high incentives (induced by high wages) and reducing turnover costs (which also increase with equilibrium wages): Even if maximum incentives are enforceable, employers induce an eort level that is ineciently low.
In this case, a minimum wage can reduce (and even completely oset) this inecency.
Assume the minimum wage binds and hence is higher than the payment needed to implement the (initial) prot-maximizing eort level. Then, additional rents are going to all employed agents. However, the principal is able to retrieve parts of these rents by demanding higher eort -which is possible because the minimum wage relaxes an agent's incentive compatibility constraint. Since eort is ineciently low if rms are free in setting wages, the minimum wage increases the eciency of an employment relationship.
There is evidence that a minimum wage increases productivity, and that this is driven by higher eort levels of employees. Galinda-Rueda and Pereira (2004) and Rizov and Croucher (2011) analyze how the introduction of a National Minimum Wage in Britain in 1999 aected labor productivity. Both nd a positive and signicant eect -in particular in the service sector. In addition, several surveys attempt to provide a better understanding of the specic channels that induced the observed productivity increases. Indeed, these surveys nd that a substantial amount of rms responded to the minimum wage by inducing higher eort of workers or by providing higher service quality (Low Pay Commission, 2001, or Heyes and Gray, 2003) .
In a next step, I test the robustness of the main result -that a minimum wage increases eort and eciency -in alternative settings. In one extension, I relax the assumption that a principal can fully observe an employed agent's eort. Instead, she can just use the resulting output as an imperfect signal. If a minimum wage is suciently high, it will still cause higher eort and eciency levels. Furthermore, asymmetric information can make it optimal to use termination in equilibrium to provide incentives. The reason is that if only contingent payments are used, compensation after a good outcome has to be higher than after a low outcome. As the lower wage must not undercut a minimum wage, compensation after observing the good outcome has to be adjusted accordingly to maintain incentives. Then, replacing an agent after a low outcome instead of paying him the minimum wage can become an alternative. This increases turnover costs (which are still required to keep the principal from reneging) but induces stronger incentives. Hence, turnover levels are generally higher when a minimum wage is present. However, a marginal increase of the minimum wage will at some point induce less turnover, which is driven by the positive impact of the wage oor on eort: When agents work harder, the likelihood of the output being low -and correspondingly the probability of a termination -goes down.
These results are supported by empirical evidence. Industries facing a minimum wage are usually characterized by high turnover levels. I show that this does not have to be an exogenuously given property but can also be driven by a rm's consideration to give incentives optimally. Furthermore, the negative marginal impact of a higher minimum wage on turnover has been documented by Portugal 
Related Literature
An important and considerable amount of research deals with employment eects of minimum wages. The hypothesis derived from the standard textbook model of a labor market -that a binding minimum wage leads to job losses -is now seriously questioned. Empirical studies like Card and Krueger (1994) , Katz and Krueger (1992) , Machin and Manning (1994) and most recently Dube et al. (2010) suggest that the employment eect of a minimum wage is not necessarily negative and might even be slightly positive. Other articles (for overviews see Brown, 1982, or Neumark and Wascher, 2007) still claim that a minimum wage destroys jobs.
Several theoretical models have been developed to explain the observed patterns. Bhashkar and To (1999) develop a model of monopsonistic competition where a minimum wage raises employment per rm but causes rms to exit the market, whereas other models focus on the importance of match specic human capital (Miller, 1984 , or Flinn, 1986 . Generally rentcreating search frictions are used as an explanation for the seemingly counterintuitive outcome that a minimum wage does not necessarily destroy jobs (based on Burdett and Mortensen, 1998, see also Card and Krueger, 1995 , Flinn, 2006 , or Dube et al., 2011 .
However, these articles abstract from incentives, which have been given almost no attention in the relevant literature. Exceptions are Swinkels (2009, 2010) and Rebitzer and Taylor (1995) . Swinkels (2009, 2010) analyze the eect of a wage oor in a standard moral hazard setting. They show that a minimum wage generally has a negative impact on induced eort levels. Dierent from my setting, they assume that agents are risk averse, eort cannot be observed, and an explicit contract is feasible. Then, a higher wage oor (i.e. payments that have to be made for the lowest output realization) generally increases the marginal costs of inducing eort, reducing total incentives given to employees. However, the non-verability of certain activities will often render explicit contracts infeasible, especially in the service sector where minimum wage laws are particularly important. Rebitzer and Taylor (1995) develop an eciency wage model where a minimum wage makes it easier for rms to prevent a given number of employees from shirking. Thereby, the authors can explain positive employment eects of a minimum wage, however do not take the impact on a worker's productivity into account.
While I focus on the impact of a minimum wage on the quality of the work provided, quantity aspects have been analyzed as well. Strobl and Walsh (2011) , for example, use a competitive model of the labor market to show that a minimum wage can either increase or decrease the hours worked by an employee. I abstract from the amount of hours workedwhich are veriable -and instead focus on the usually non-veriable aspect of service quality.
Finally, this article relates to the literature on relational contracts. MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) and Levin (2003) are probably the most prominent contributions to relational contracting in a setting with just one principal and one agent, and show that optimal contracts can take a rather simple form. Within a market setting, i.e. when agents are replaceable, MacLeod and Malcomson (1998) derive the necessity of endogenous turnover costs as a feature of productive employment relationships, Yang (2011) shows that exogenous turnover costs can under some conditions increase social welfare, while Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013) characterize a market equilibrium if on-the-job-search is possible. In addition, Yang (2013) shows that it is optimal to backload wages in a relational contracting setting where agents can be replaced and can either be of a productive or an unproductive type.
Model Setup
The economy consists of a mass 1 of small, identical rms (principal, she) and a mass of N > 1 identical employees (agent, he). Principals and agents are risk neutral. The time horizon is innite, time is discrete (periods are denoted t = 1, 2, ...), and all players share a common discount factor δ. All players are either part of a match or not. At the beginning of each period t, every unmatched principal can oer a contract to exactly one unmatched agent. This oer consists of a legally enforceable wage payment w t and the promise to pay a discretionary bonus b t ≥ 0. A principal who does not make an oer or gets rejected consumes his outside utility π in the respective period, where I make the normalization π = 0.
If an agent receives no oer from a principal or rejects an oer, he consumes his exogenuous outside utility, which is set to zero (note that an agent's endogenous outside utility -which reects the possibility of nding a job with a positive rent and is introduced below -can actually be positive). All employed agents then consume w t and choose eort e t ∈ [0, 1]. This generates output y t = θ with probabability e t , and output y t = 0 with probability (1 − e t ).
While output is directly consumed by the principal, an agent faces eort costs c(e t ), with c , c > 0, and lim e→1 c(e) = ∞. Then, the principal has the choice to pay b t , followed by an exogenous shock which makes some agents leave the market (for example because the partner found a job somewhere else). With probability (1 − γ), each agent -no matter whether employed or not -leaves the market and remains for another period with probability γ. As low-wage industries tend to have high turnover rates (Brown et al, 1982) , exogenous turnover is a prominent phenomenon in the present setting.
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If an agent exits the market for exogenous reasons, he leaves for good and receives a payo normalized to zero from then on. Note that this assumption is without loss of generality even when an agent expects a positive utility while being on the market. Furthermore, the number of employees remains xed over time, hence (1 − γ)N new agents enter the market in every period. At the end of period t, an employed agent who has not left the market for exogenous reasons can get a contract oer by his current employer, consisting of the wage w t+1 and bonus b t+1 . If the agent accepts it, the match continues for another period. In any other case, i.e.
if the principal does not make an oer or the agent does not accept, both enter the matching market in the next period.
The timing within a period t is summarized in the following graph: Using d P t ∈ {0, 1} to describe whether a principal is in a relationship in period t and, the payo stream of an arbitrary principal at the beginning of a period t equals
Using d A t ∈ {0, 1} to describe whether an agent is in a relationship (by construction, this implies that d A t = 0 once an agent left the market for exogenous reasons), an arbitrary agent
Information and Equilibrium Concept I assume the following information structure. Within a match, information is symmetric. This implies that eort and output can be observed by both players. However, neither eort nor output are veriable, i.e., no explicit contract based on them can be written.
All players outside a match (the market) cannot observe anything that happens within a Therefore, I follow the literature on imperfect public monitoring and use the solution concept of a pure-strategy public perfect equilibrium (PPE) to deal with an individual employment relationship: Each player's actions only depend on the public history they share with the respective partner. Put dierently, the oer a principal makes to a new agent is independent of whether the previously employed worker has left for exogenous reasons or not; the same is true for the agent's decision concerning acceptance or rejection of a received oer, and concerning rst-period eort. When a match has been active for a while, players' actions in addition depend on the events that were observed within the respective relationship.
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In addition, a player's strategy will depend on the strategies of all market participants, even though the market is not transparent. Hence, the market as a whole will be in a social equilibrium, as for example described by Ghosh and Ray (1996) , Kranton (1996) , or MacLeod and Malcomson (1998). This implies that a social norm can determine the exact outcome, as long as it is also an equilibrium of the dynamic game.
Taken together, each rm decides about its wage oer and whether to continue an employment relationship in a way that maximizes Π t in each period t, given publicly observable past events, as well as strategies of agents and all other rms on and o equilibrium. Each agent decides about whether to accept a wage oer and subsequently chooses his eort in a way that maximizes U t in each period, given past events observed by herself and the principal (especially past wage oers), and given on-and o-equilibrium strategies of rms and all other agents. Finally, I focus on symmetric equilibria, and assume that principals have no preferences concerning the identity of agents.
To simplify the following analysis, I further restrict strategies to be contract-specic in the sense of Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013). This implies that actions of the rm and workers do not depend on the identity of the worker, calendar time, or history outside the current relationship. This assumption is without loss of generality for all periods except the rst period of the whole game. In section 5 below, I relax this assumption and show that my results are not aected qualitatively when strategies are not restricted to be contract-specic.
Prot-Maximizing Equilibria Without a Minimum Wage
In this section, I solve for a social equilibrium that maximizes a principal's payo -taking the behavior of all other principals as given (in section 5 below, I take a brief look at the equilibrium that maximizes joint prots). The selection of this particular equilibrium can be justied by the rms having all bargaining power. Hence, a rm with a vacant employment opportunity can make a take-it-or-leave-it oer to an arbitrary agent. Furthermore, Manning (2003) presents evidence that employers actually set wages in markets where a minimum wage is relevant. He states that for the average worker in a non-union setting, this does seem to be the appropriate assumption (p. 4).
Payos and Constraints
The focus on contract-specic strategies makes calendar time irrelevant, which allows to omit the t-subscript. However, the timing within a specic relationship might matter, for example whether it is in an early or a later stage. Hence, I use the subscript τ = 1, 2, ... to denote the period a given relationship is in.
Given that agents do not get red and always accept employment oers in equilibrium, an employed agent's discounted payo stream in the τ 's employment period is denoted U τ and
where e * τ is equilibrium eort in empoyment period τ . Future payos δU τ +1 only enter with probability γ, since the agent might leave the market for exogenous reasons (with probability (1 − γ)), then receiving a payo of zero.
An agent currently unemployed but on the market at the beginning of a period receives a job oer with probability µ ≡
. Thus, an agent`s endogenous reservation utility U (in contrast to an agent's exogenous outside utility which is set to zero) equals
As strategies are independent of calendar time and because of market intransparency, U is constant over time. Furthermore, the actions of a single player have no impact on the value of U , and it is taken as given by all players. This also implies that collusion among principals is precluded, an issue briey discussed in section 5.
In equilibrium, several constraints have to be satised for any agent who is part of a match. First of all, an agent must prefer to be employed rather than not. This implies that the utilities U τ must exceed the endogenous reservation utility U , which is captured by an agent's individual rationality (IRA) constraints,
Furthermore, given U τ and U , it must be in the interest of an employed agent to actually choose equilibrium eort e * τ in period τ , i.e. his incentive compatibility (IC) constraint must be satised. Here, I assume that an agent who does not exert e * τ is red, 5 -recall that eort is observable and cheating will therefore never happen in equilibrium -and re-enters the job market in the subsequent period. If an agent deviates and chooses an eort level dierent from equilibrium eort, he will obviously set e = 0 (or put dierently: if satised for e τ = 0, (IC) also holds for any other eort level). Thus, (IC) equals
Hence, an agent can be compensated for his eort either by a bonus paid at the end of period τ or by future payo streams, in particular involving xed wage payments in future periods.
A principal's payo in the τ 's period of a relationship is denoted Π τ and equals
As the current relationship is only continued with probability 1 − γ, the payo of starting a new relationship, Π 1 , enters future payos with probability γ. Each principal faces the following constraints. First of all, starting a new or maintaining an ongoing employment relationship should be better than completely shutting down. This gives a principal's individual rationality (IRP) constraint
Furthermore, each principal must have an incentive to honor his promises and compensate an employed agent accordingly. Because compensation can either consist of a bonus paid at 5 Following Abreu (1998), the most severe punishment after cheating can be used to characterize any equilibrium.
the end of a period or future wage payments, two sets of constraints are necessary. Generally, if a principal reneges and refuses to either pay the promised bonus or oer a new contract with an appropriate wage, I make the standard assumption that all trust is lost in the specic relationship, the employed agent does not believe the rm`s promises anymore and is not willing to exert positive eort from then on. However, agents can be replaced, and information regarding the principal's past behavior cannot be transmitted to potential future employees.
This prevents the use of multilateral relational contracts (Levin 2002 ), i.e., a principal cannot be punished for misbehavior in the past by agents not involved back then. After a deviation, a principal hence will re the agent and start a new relationship (shutting down will not be optimal in an equilibrium where a principal chooses to run the business in the rst place because of (IRP)).
A dynamic enforcement (DE) constraint makes sure that paying the bonus at the end of period τ is optimal for the principal -compared to reneging and starting a new empoyment relationship in period τ + 1. Hence,
where I have to take the possibility into account that the principal might also have to start a new employment relationship after paying the bonus -namely when the agent leaves the market for exogenous reasons. Note that although there is excess supply of labor and rms can ll vacancies immediately, bonuses can be self-enforced in this market -prots from starting a new relationship, Π 1 , just have to be suciently small.
At the end of the period, agents who are employed and did not leave the market are supposed to receive an oer by their current employer for the subsequent period. The nonreneging (NR) constraint guarantees that it is optimal for a principal to actually make this oer, in contrast to re the current employee, enter the matching market in the subsequent period and start a new employment relationship.
Hence, (NR) constraints are
Given the constraints just derived, my objective is to nd the social equilibrium that maximizes a principal's prot, Π 1 . However, the problem can be substantially simplied. First of all, it is possible to only use wage payments to compensate agents for their eort, and set b τ = 0 in all periods.
Lemma 1: Without loss of generality, it is possible to set b τ = 0 in all periods τ ≥ 1.
Proof : Assume there is a prot-maximizing equilibrium with Π 1 ≥ 0 (then, (NR) implies Bonus payments and xed wages are substitutes, and replacing one by the other has no impact on the principal's prots. Note that the same would be true if there was an additional possibility for principals to reward agents, namely a bonus paid immediately after realization of the shock that some agents leave the market. There are two reason why using wage payments instead of bonuses is more convenient. On the one hand, a minimum wage aects total wage payments within a period. On the other hand, the (NR) constraint might make it necessary to pay a xed wage in the rst period of a relationship, even if only bonus payments are used later.
Proposition 1 has several consequences. Given (NR) constraints, (DE) constraints are not needed anymore, and an (IRP) constraint is only needed for period 1. Furthermore, (IRA)
can be omitted for all periods τ ≥ 2 because the fact that no bonus payments are used implies -in combination with (IC) constraints -that U τ − U > 0 in all periods τ ≥ 2.
In a next step, I show that stationary contracts are optimal in all periods τ ≥ 2, i.e. that eort and wages are constant over time.
Lemma 2: Equilibrium eort in all periods τ satises e * τ ≤ e F B , where e F B is the surplusmaximizing, rst-best eort level e F B and characterized by θ = c .
Furthermore, a prot-maximizing social equilibrium is stationary in a sense that it is optimal to have w τ = w τ and e τ = e τ in all periods τ, τ ≥ 2.
The proof to Lemma 2 can be found in Appendix A.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. If eort in one period is higher than in another, it will generally be possible to increase the lower eort at no cost for the principal besides compensating the agent for his additional eort. This would increase the principal's prots as long as eort does not exceed its ecient level.
Concerning wages, it does not matter for an agent whether he is compensated for his eort immediately (i.e., by the wage paid in the subsequent period) or by a (credible) promise of future payments. Each non-stationary contract can thus be replaced by a stationary one, namely by averaging out changes in promised continuation payos.
We only have to consider the rst period of a new relationship independently, as it includes turnover costs that keep rms from reneging.
Proposition 1: Turnover must be costly for the rm. This implies that either w 1 > 0 or e 1 < e * , where e * is equilibrium eort in all periodsτ ≥ 2.
Proof : Using previously derived results that eort and wages are constant in all periods τ ≥ 2, and denoting equilibrium wages w * , the (NR) constraint in all these periods becomes (e * θ − w * ) ≥ e 1 θ − w 1 .
Q.E.D.
Turnover costs are necessary due to the intransparency of the labor market, rendering it impossible for rms to establish a market reputation for keeping their promises. Without turnover costs, rms would have no incentives to keep their promises, and equilibria with positive eort would not exist. To see this point, assume that principals did not face these costs and were able to completely extract the surplus generated within an employment relationship.
Then, the wage in the rst period of an employment relationship, w 1 , would be zero (and e 1 = e * ), whereas wages paid in later periods had to be strictly positive to compensate agents for past eort. Hence, rms would always renounce, re an agent at the end of the period instead of oering a subsequent contract, and employ a new agent. This turnover can either manifest in a rent going to new agents -w 1 > 0 -or a destruction of surplus (e 1 < e * ). Of course, any combination satisfying the (NR) constraint (e * θ − w * ) ≥ e 1 θ − w 1 also works, as well as other (observable) means of money burning conducted by the principal (see MacLeod,
2003, for a discussion of several options to conduct money burning).
An interesting aspect of this result is that a productive current relationship can only be sustained if starting any relationship in the future is costly for the respective principalalthough neither principals nor agents are able to observe anything that happens outside the matches they are part of. Hence, the social equilibrium requires some norm that determines how any relationship starts. If this norm did not exist, the static Nash equilibrium with no eort would be the unique outcome of the game.
There, Lemma 1 implies that either surplus must be destroyed by a voluntary reduction of rst-period eort, or a rent must be given to newly employed agents. Both approaches have been used in comparable models.
6 I follow MacLeod and Malcomson (1998) and only use the rst-period wage w 1 to induce appropriate turnover costs (hence, e 1 = e * ). The reasons are twofold. On the one hand, this equilibrium does not destroy any surplus but only reects a redistribution from principals to agents. On the other hand, the introduction of a minimum wage -which is analyzed below -forces the principals to pay a certain wage level already in the rst period of an employment relationship. However, any other form of turnover costs as described in the previous paragraph would leave the main result of this paper (see Proposition 3 below) unaected. Now, the (NR) constraint equals w 1 ≥ w, and newly employed agents receive an upfront payment which has to be at least as high as the wage workers with longer tenure get as a compensation for past eort. These costs cannot be avoided in equilibrium. Instead, principals will be exposed to them all the time an agent leaves for exogenous reasons and consequently has to be replaced. As turnover costs must increase with equilibrium compensation, rms face a trade-o between giving optimal incentives and reducing turnover costs. This induces them to voluntarily reduce the feasible eort level and thus the relationship surplus:
Proposition 2: Given Π 1 > 0, prot-maximizing per period eort level e * is characterized by c = δγθ. 
s.t.
Social equilibria there contain a probation phase with reduced eort in the onset of a relationship to learn about a partner's type. Similarly, Watson (1999) shows that starting small is optimal in the case of two-sided incomplete information. MacLeod and Malcomson (1998) in a setting more similar to the present one propose a social equilibrium with eciency wages where newly employed agents receive a rent. There, the xed wage paid in every period has the status of a fair wage in this market -if it is not oered at the onset of an employment relationship, the respective employer is not regarded trustworthy.
c(e * ) δγ ≥ 0
(IRA) will always be satised and hence can be omitted. (IRP) is satised by assumption to avoid non-trivial solutions without production. As U is not aected by a single principal's actions, the prots of a rm are maximized if eort is characterized by θ − c δγ = 0. Q.E.D.
Because ecient eort is characterized by c = θ, equilibrium eort is ineciently low. This ineciency is not induced by the future surplus being too low (which I assume it is not) but by the inability of principals to establish an external reputation. The necessary turnover costs make principals face a tradeo between surplus maximization and the minimization of turnover costs: When giving stronger incentives and consequently increasing the surplus, a principal also raises the rent she has to give to agents. Hence, utility is not perfectly transferable, unlike in standard relational contracts setting with one principal and one agent, see e.g. Levin (2003) . There, the provision of incentives can be separated from surplus distribution, and it is thus convenient to focus on equilibria that maximize total surplus. In my setting, social equilibria that maximize prots (which are my focus because rms represent the short side of the market) yield a dierent outcome with respect to eort and eciency than equilibria with other underlying objective functions.
4 The Impact of a Minimum Wage on Eort and Surplus
If the labor market is characterized by voluntary turnover, a lack of transparency, and nonveriability of the quality with which employees execute their tasks, a binding minimum wage can counteract eciency losses induced by an employer's inability to establish an external reputation:
Proposition 3: Assume total wage payments in a period cannot be lower than a minimum wage w. If the minimum wage binds and prots are still positive, eort is higher than in a situation without a minimum wage and increases in w. The total surplus created within a relationship increases in w as long as w is not too large. Finally, a minimum wage reduces rms' prots, whereas agents benet.
Proof : When a minimum wage w is present, the constraint w ≥ w is added to the max- > 0, establishing that eort is higher with a binding minimum wage than without, and further increasing in w.
The per period surplus created by an employed agent equals s ≡ e * θ − c(e * ). Therefore,
which is positive as long as θ ≥ c .
The impact on prots for relationship starting after the introduction of a minimum wage is given by
This result is driven by the binding (IC) constraint. If rms are forced to pay a higher wage than intended, they are able to get something back by requiring those agents who want to keep their jobs to work harder. As rms enforced ineciently low eort before, a binding minimum wage can increase the surplus of each employment relationship. If the minimum wage is too high, though, the surplus of an employment relationship goes down. Nevertheless, implemented eort unambigously increases in w. There is evidence that the productivity of rms indeed goes up after the introduction of a minimum wage, and that these productivity gains are particularly signicant for rms in the Rizov and Croucher (2011) conduct a further study on the eect of the British National Minimum Wage. They compute a structural estimation of production functions within disaggregate 4-digit industries, controlling for supply and demand factors that aect rms. Hence, a minimum wage potentially aects rm productivity through the input price channel. They nd that productivity substantially went up after the introduction -and subsequent increases -of the minimum wage, again with a substantially higher impact in service industries than in manufacturing.
However, both studies can only speculate on the factors that cause the observed productivity increases. In general, productivity might go up because of reductions in employment or working hours (which however was not observed in both studies), the adjustment of prices, or issues like training, changes in the organizational structure of rms, or -as is the point of this paper -the provision of more eort and hence a higher service quality.
Several studies attempt to ll this gap, conducting extensive surveys in which managers were asked how they responded to the introduction of the British National Minimum Wage. 
Robustness
In this section, I relax some assumptions and show that the main results continue hold.
Asymmetric Information
In many instances, it will not be possible or simply too expensive for rms to continuously monitor an employee's actions. Then, rms might not be able to observe an agent's eort but only the resulting output y t . In that case, the impossibility for rms to create an external reputation also leads to an imposed eort level that is ineciently small, and a suciently high minimum wage can increase eort and surplus.
Furthermore, under asymmetric information it can be optimal to re the agent after a low outcome if the minimum wage is binding. Without a termination threat, incentives are solely given by two wage levels -a high wage denoted w + after y = θ, and a low wage w − after y = 0. Since w − cannot be below w, a higher minimum wage -for a given eort level -also triggers an increase in w + . However, principals are forced to pay the high wage to any new agent -otherwise, they would always renege after a good outcome.
Firing an agent after a low outcome (and only rewarding the agent after a high outcome) generates two eects. On the one hand, expected turnover costs increase for a given wage, as agents do not only leave the rm for exogenous reasons anymore. On the other hand, the agent's payo after a low outcome is reduced, and it becomes cheaper to provide incentives.
In the following, the endogenously determined probability of a continuation of the relationship after a low output was observed (conditional on the agent not leaving for exogenous reasons) is denoted α. However, I assume that α ∈ {0, 1}, hence an agent is either always red after a low outcome, or never. This is mainly done for concreteness, as allowing for intermediate values would not give additional results.
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The main results are presented in Proposition 4, a more elaborate analysis can be found in Appendix B. There, I derive the stationary equilibrium in contract-specic strategies that maximizes each principal's prots at the beginning of a new employment relationship.
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Proposition 4: Assume eort is an agent's private information, but output is observable to both parties. Then, implemented eort in prot-maximizing equilibria is ineciently low if no minimum wage is present. If a minimum wage is present and as long as a principal's prots are positive, there exists a threshold w # such that α = 1 for w ≤ w # and α = 0 for w > w # .
Eort is aected by the minimum wage in the following way:
If w ≤ w # and the minimum wage binds, i.e. determines w − , there exists a threshold w such that 9 Note that the restriction to stationary contracts is not without loss of generality here. Instead of terminating the relationship with the same probability in every period, the principal could make αt contingent on the whole respective output history. Fong and Li (2010) provide a complete characterization of optimal relational contracts in non-market relationships (i.e., with just one principal and one agent), where the agent faces a limited liability constraint and eort is binary.
The proof to Proposition 4 can be found in Appendix B.
Ineciently low eort is still driven by a principal's inability to establish an external reputation, hence new agents must receive an rent. Dierent from before, a minimum wage that binds -but is suciently small for α = 1 to be optimal -has no positive impact on eort.
First, eort is slightly reduced and then remains unaected by a further increase in w. If the minimum wage is suciently large, ring an agent after a low outcome becomes optimal. This increases his incentives to exert eort, since staying in an employment relationship is strictly better than getting red and receiving U . This reduction in the costs of providing incentives at some point exceeds the higher turnover costs. When α = 0 is optimal, a further increase in w increases eort and -up to some point -also the surplus of an employment relationship.
Proposition 4 implies that a minimum wage not only has an impact on eort levels, but also on turnover and wage compression within an industry. If a minimum wage exists, turnover should generally be higher than otherwise. However, if the minimum wage is suciently high, an additional increase will trigger less turnover. The latter is implied by the minimum wage's positive impact on eort, which makes a realization of the low output -and thus a layo -less likely.
There exists a considerable amount of empirical evidence that these outcomes are indeed observed when a minimum wage is present. Generally, industries where a minimum wage is relevant -like the fast food industry -are characterized by high turnover levels (see Brown et al., 1982) . Although low wage industries are generally considered to face high turnover, some of this might be driven by a rm's optimal provision of incentives. The negative marginal impact of a minimum wage increase on turnover has been well established empirically. Portugal and Cardoso (2006) nd that separations of teenage workers in Portugal decreased after a minimum wage increase, while Dube et al. (2007) observe that average tenure rose substantially in restaurants in San Francisco. The most recent contribution is Dube et al. (2011) , who also nd strong evidence that turnover rates for teenagers and restaurant workers fall after a minimum wage increase.
Furthermore, a minimum wage induces wage compression. As long as the minimum wage is so low that agents remain employed after a low output, wages paid after a low and those after a high output realization are dierent. When the minimum wage is suciently high and agents get red when y = 0, all employed agents receive the same wage in every period. An early empirical contribution exploring wage compression is Grossman (1983), later followed by Katz and Krueger (1998) , who nd that the minimum wage has induced wage compression in the Texas fast food industry. Furthermore, Lee (1999) provides evidence that the substantial decline of real minimum wages in the US was mainly responsible for a sharp increase of the wage dispersion among low income workers in the eighties.
Finally, spillover eects exist, i.e. minimum wages also have an impact on higher wages.
As long as α = 1, a minimum wage also aects the high wage w + , which has to be adjusted upwards to keep incentives constant. For evidence on spillover eects see Card and Krueger (1995) , or Neumark and Wascher (2008) . Several reasons have been provided, for example that rms substitute low wage with high wage workers or that an adjustment of wages is necessary to maintain dierentials between high and low skilled workers (Grossman, 1983) . In the present setting setting, spillover eects occur even with homogenous workers, and I neither need fairness perceptions (Falk et al., 2006) nor a more advanced bargaining concept (Dittrich and Knabe, 2010) to derive this result.
First Period of the Game
The restriction to contract-specic strategies in the main setting is not completely without loss of generality, and conditioning strategies on calendar time could increase a rm's prots.
The reason is that future turnover costs are needed to persuade agents today that promises are going to be honored. In the rst period of the whole game, though, a principal has not been able to renege yet. Hence, there is no need to give the rst employed agent a rent, and costs only accrue after this rst agent has left for exogenous reasons.
In this section, I show that relaxing the assumption concerning contract-specic strategies and letting period t = 1 be treated dierently from later ones is associated with higher eort levels as long as no minimum wage is present. However, exogenous turnover will still make it optimal for principals to induce ineciently low eort. Since an agent's (IC) constraint solely depends on future payments, eort in the rst period of the game will be the same as later, i.e., e 0 = e * . Furthermore, an agent's outside option in the rst period equals U 0 = δγU .
As before, (IC) as well as (NR) constraints bind in equilibrium, with the exception that no (NR) constraint is needed for the rst period of the game. Plugging the resulting values into the payo functions, and noting that an (IRA) constraint is only needed for the rst period of the game (in all later periods, it is automatically satised given (IC)), yields the remaining constraints w 0 ≥ 0
(IRA 0) has to bind in equilibrium, as otherwise a reduction would increase Π 0 without violating any constraint. Hence, w 0 = 0, and principals implement the eort level that max-
. As long as no minimum wage is present, eort is thus given
If the rst period of the game can be treated dierently from later ones, eort is higher than before (there, δγθ − c = 0). However, eort is still ineciently low, and the impact of the minimum wage remains unaected -if it is suciently high, it triggers an increase in eort and surplus within an employment relationship.
Collusion
The social equilibrium derived before maximizes a principal's prots, taking the behavior of all other principals as given. This implies that rms do not consider the impact of their choices on agents' outside options and on rents other rms have to pay. If the social equilibrium is characterized by contracts that maximize rms' joint utilities (subject to all constraints), implemented eort in the absence of a minimum wage will be lower than before. Lemma 4: In the social equilibrium maximizing joint prots, equilibrium eort is given by c = θδγ(1 − µ). Under collusion, eort is lower than before (where eort is characterized by c = δγθ). The reason is that lower eort and consequently lower wages also reduce an agent's outside option.
In this case, potential benets of a minimum wage would be higher than before.
Such an equilibrium might be induced by collusion amongst rms, or by assuming that all of them are owned by one player. As long as information concerning the behavior of agents is not shared between the rms, the owner would optimally set wages that take the impact on an agent's outside option into account. Such a market might exist in the fast food industry -a market where minimum wages are particularly relevant -where many restaurants are run by franchisees who are relatively independent when running their outlets. Coordination on lower wages than individually optimal would be benecial for the chain as a whole. Then, a minimum wage has an even bigger potential to increase the productivity of employment relationships.
Conclusion
Incentives should not be neglected when analyzing the impact of a minimum wage. How well a job is actually done is important in the service sector -where minimum wage laws are especially relevant -and employees need to be incentivized to perform accordingly. If relevant aspects of performance like the friendliness towards customers cannot be veried, relational contracts must be used to give incentives. As rms face a commitment problem in the case of intransparent labor markets, they enforce ineciently low service quality. If forced to pay a higher wage than actually intended, they also require higher levels of eort. Thus, a minimum wage can increase service quality and even the eciency of many occupations.
There is evidence that the proposed mechanism indeed plays a role, however more empirical research is certainly needed.
Appendix A Omitted Proofs
Proof : The characterization of e F B follows from maximizing the per-period surplus eθ − c(e).
For the remainder, it is convenient to use the results of Lemma 1 and rewrite the remaining constraints.
To see that e * τ ≤ e F B , assume there is a period τ with e * τ > e F B . Reducing e * τ by ε, and reducing w τ accordingly to keep w τ − c(e * τ ) constant does not violate any constraint but increases Π 1 . This increases Π 1 and Π τ , however Π τ by more than Π 1 , hence relaxes (NR) and (IRP). Since Π 1 is increased, the initial equilibrium was not prot-maximizing. Now, I show that (IC) constraints bind in all periods τ ≥ 1: Assume that the protmaximizing equilibrium containts a period τ where (IC) does not bind. Then (IRA) might or might not bind. If it does not bind, reduce w τ +1 by a small ε > 0 such that (IC) in period τ and (IRA) are still satised, as well as (IRA). This increases Π 1 and Π τ , however Π τ by more than Π 1 , hence relaxes (NR) and (IRP). Since Π 1 is increased, the initial equilibrium was not prot-maximizing.
If (IRA) binds, the reduction of w τ +1 can be accompanied by an increase in w 1 such that (IRA) just remains binding.
Using this result and plugging c(e τ ) = δγ
os gives U τ = w τ + δγU and
for all periods τ ≥ 2, and constraints
In a next step, I show that eort is identical in all periods τ ≥ 2. Assume to the contrary that this is not the case and there is at least one period with an eort level dierent from the others. Hence, dening e max = max{e * 2 , e * 3 , ....}, there is at least one period with eort strictly lower than e max . Now, take the rst period where equilibrium eort is e max and denote this period τ (≥ 2).
Then, either (A) eort in all subsequent periods is e max as well, or (B), there is at least one period τ > τ , with e * τ < e max .
In case (A), we have
, and
However, due to the denition of e max and since not all eort levels are identical in periods τ ≥ 2, e * τ −1 < e max . Hence, Π τ > Π τ +k , i.e., the (NR) constraint does not bind in period τ . Now, increase eort in period τ − 1 by an ε > 0, thereby also increasing Π 1 (since e * τ −1 ≤ e F B ). If (NR) was not binding in periods τ + k, k ≥ 1, higher eort in period τ − 1 increases Π 1 without violating any constraint, and represents an improvement for principals. If (NR) was initially binding in periods τ + k, k ≥ 1, w 1 can be raised to a level keeping Π 1 constant.
In case (B), note that 
An agent's eort is determined by his incentive compatibility (IC) constraint, with e * ∈ argmax − c(e) + δγ eU
Finally, α ∈ {0, 1}, and the wages paid by the principal must exceed a potential minimum wage.
For convenience, I set U = 0 in this section, i.e., assume that there is only one rm present.
However, this has no qualitative impact on my results.
Then, the objective is to maximize prots from starting a new relationship, i.e., 
Now, assume that (MW) binds. If (IRA) does not bind, (4) gives that eort is characterized by θ − c − c 1 − δγ(1 − e * ) δγ = 0.
Since eort has to be continuous in w, there will be a range where both, (MW) and (IRA)
bind, and eort is at levels between those characterized by (6) and (7).
Hence, when the minimum wage becomes binding, eort rst decreases (since w = c(e * ) − e * c in this range), and then remains constant.
As long as the minimum wage does not bind, 
Again, it is assumed that λ IRP = 0.
When λ M W = 0, eort is characterized by θ − c δγ (1 − δγe * ) = 0.
If the minimum wage is suciently high for λ M W > 0, eort is characterized by w = c δγ (1 − δγe * ) + c(e * ). These considerations allow me to prove Proposition 4: Assume eort is an agent's private information, but output is observable to both parties. Then, implemented eort in prot-maximizing equilibria is ineciently low if no minimum wage is present. If a minimum wage is present and as long as a principal's prots are positive, there exists a threshold w # such that α = 1 for w ≤ w # and α = 0 for w > w # . Eort is aected by the minimum wage in the following way.
If w ≤ w # and the minimum wage binds, i.e. determines w − , there exists a threshold w such that To establish the threshold w # , note that when the minimum wage binds but (IRA) is slack,
, with a strict inequality for w suciently large.
Since α = 1 is optimal for w suciently small, the threshold as described in the Proposition exists.
The rest of the Proposition follows from the considerations in cases (A) and (B) above.
